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Abstract
Drawing appropriate defeasible infer-
ences has been proven to be one of the
most pervasive puzzles of natural lan-
guage processing and a recurrent prob-
lem in pragmatics. This paper pro-
vides a theoretical framework, called
stratified logic, that can accommodate
defeasible pragmatic inferences. The
framework yields an algorithm that
computes the conversational, conven-
tional, scalar, clausal, and normal
state implicatures; and the presuppo-
sitions that are associated with utter-
ances. The algorithm applies equally
to simple and complex utterances and
sequences of utterances.
1 Pragmatics and Defeasibility
It is widely acknowledged that a full account of nat-
ural language utterances cannot be given in terms of
only syntactic or semantic phenomena. For example,
Hirschberg (1985) has shown that in order to under-
stand a scalar implicature, one must analyze the con-
versants’ beliefs and intentions. To recognize normal
state implicatures one must consider mutual beliefs
and plans (Green, 1990). To understand conversa-
tional implicatures associated with indirect replies
one must consider discourse expectations, discourse
plans, and discourse relations (Green, 1992; Green
and Carberry, 1994). Some presuppositions are in-
ferrable when certain lexical constructs (factives,
aspectuals, etc) or syntactic constructs (cleft and
pseudo-cleft sentences) are used. Despite all the
complexities that individualize the recognition stage
for each of these inferences, all of them can be de-
feated by context, by knowledge, beliefs, or plans of
the agents that constitute part of the context, or by
other pragmatic rules.
Defeasibility is a notion that is tricky to deal with,
and scholars in logics and pragmatics have learned
to circumvent it or live with it. The first observers
of the phenomenon preferred to keep defeasibility
outside the mathematical world. For Frege (1892),
Russell (1905), and Quine (1949) “everything ex-
ists”; therefore, in their logical systems, it is im-
possible to formalize the cancellation of the presup-
position that definite referents exist (Hirst, 1991;
Marcu and Hirst, 1994). We can taxonomize pre-
vious approaches to defeasible pragmatic inferences
into three categories (we omit here work on defea-
sibility related to linguistic phenomena such as dis-
course, anaphora, or speech acts).
1. Most linguistic approaches account for the
defeasibility of pragmatic inferences by analyzing
them in a context that consists of all or some of
the previous utterances, including the current one.
Context (Karttunen, 1974; Kay, 1992), procedural
rules (Gazdar, 1979; Karttunen and Peters, 1979),
lexical and syntactic structure (Weischedel, 1979),
intentions (Hirschberg, 1985), or anaphoric con-
straints (Sandt, 1992; Zeevat, 1992) decide what pre-
suppositions or implicatures are projected as prag-
matic inferences for the utterance that is analyzed.
The problem with these approaches is that they as-
sign a dual life to pragmatic inferences: in the initial
stage, as members of a simple or complex utterance,
they are defeasible. However, after that utterance
is analyzed, there is no possibility left of cancelling
that inference. But it is natural to have implicatures
and presuppositions that are inferred and cancelled
as a sequence of utterances proceeds: research in
conversation repairs (Hirst et al., 1994) abounds in
such examples. We address this issue in more detail
in section 3.3.
2. One way of accounting for cancellations that
occur later in the analyzed text is simply to extend
the boundaries within which pragmatic inferences
are evaluated, i.e., to look ahead a few utterances.
Green (1992) assumes that implicatures are con-
nected to discourse entities and not to utterances,
but her approach still does not allow cancellations
across discourse units.
3. Another way of allowing pragmatic inferences
to be cancelled is to assign them the status of de-
feasible information. Mercer (1987) formalizes pre-
suppositions in a logical framework that handles
defaults (Reiter, 1980), but this approach is not
tractable and it treats natural disjunction as an
exclusive-or and implication as logical equivalence.
Computational approaches fail to account for
the cancellation of pragmatic inferences: once
presuppositions (Weischedel, 1979) or implica-
tures (Hirschberg, 1985; Green, 1992) are generated,
they can never be cancelled. We are not aware of
any formalism or computational approach that of-
fers a unified explanation for the cancellability of
pragmatic inferences in general, and of no approach
that handles cancellations that occur in sequences of
utterances.
It is our aim to provide such an approach here. In
doing this, we assume the existence, for each type of
pragmatic inference, of a set of necessary conditions
that must be true in order for that inference to be
triggered. Once such a set of conditions is met, the
corresponding inference is drawn, but it is assigned
a defeasible status. It is the role of context and
knowledge of the conversants to “decide” whether
that inference will survive or not as a pragmatic in-
ference of the structure. We put no boundaries upon
the time when such a cancellation can occur, and we
offer a unified explanation for pragmatic inferences
that are inferable when simple utterances, complex
utterances, or sequences of utterances are consid-
ered.
We propose a new formalism, called “stratified
logic”, that correctly handles the pragmatic infer-
ences, and we start by giving a very brief introduc-
tion to the main ideas that underlie it. We give
the main steps of the algorithm that is defined on
the backbone of stratified logic. We then show how
different classes of pragmatic inferences can be cap-
tured using this formalism, and how our algorithm
computes the expected results for a representative
class of pragmatic inferences. The results we report
here are obtained using an implementation written
in Common Lisp that uses Screamer (Siskind and
McAllester, 1993), a macro package that provides
nondeterministic constructs.
2 Stratified logic
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Figure 1: The lattice that underlies stratified logic
2.1 Theoretical foundations
We can offer here only a brief overview of strati-
fied logic. The reader is referred to Marcu (1994)
for a comprehensive study. Stratified logic supports
one type of indefeasible information and two types
of defeasible information, namely, infelicitously de-
feasible and felicitously defeasible. The notion of
infelicitously defeasible information is meant to cap-
ture inferences that are anomalous to cancel, as in:
(1) * John regrets that Mary came to the party
but she did not come.
The notion of felicitously defeasible information is
meant to capture the inferences that can be can-
celled without any abnormality, as in:
(2) John does not regret that Mary came to the
party because she did not come.
The lattice in figure 1 underlies the semantics of
stratified logic. The lattice depicts the three lev-
els of strength that seem to account for the in-
ferences that pertain to natural language seman-
tics and pragmatics: indefeasible information be-
longs to the u layer, infelicitously defeasible infor-
mation belongs to the i layer, and felicitously de-
feasible information belongs to the d layer. Each
layer is partitioned according to its polarity in truth,
⊤u,⊤i,⊤d, and falsity, ⊥u,⊥i,⊥d. The lattice
shows a partial order that is defined over the dif-
ferent levels of truth. For example, something that
is indefeasibly false, ⊥u, is stronger (in a sense to
be defined below) than something that is infelic-
itously defeasibly true, ⊤i, or felicitously defeasi-
bly false, ⊥d. Formally, we say that the u level is
stronger than the i level, which is stronger than the
d level: u < i < d. At the syntactic level, we al-
low atomic formulas to be labelled according to the
same underlying lattice. Compound formulas are
obtained in the usual way. This will give us formu-
las such as regretsu(John, come(Mary, party)) →
comei(Mary, party)), or (∀x)(¬bacheloru(x) →
(maled(x) ∧ adultd(x))). The satisfaction relation
is split according to the three levels of truth into
u-satisfaction, i-satisfaction, and d-satisfaction:
Definition 2.1 Assume σ is an SL valuation such
that tσ
i
= di ∈ D and assume that SL maps n-ary
predicates p to relations R ⊂ D × . . . × D. For any
atomic formula px(t1, t2, . . . , tn), and any stratified
valuation σ, where x ∈ {u, i, d} and ti are terms, the
x-satisfiability relations are defined as follows:
• σ |=u pu(t1, . . . , tn) iff 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
u
• σ |=u pi(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
u ∪Ru ∪Ri
• σ |=u pd(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
u∪Ru∪Ri∪Ri∪Rd
• σ |=i pu(t1, . . . , tn) iff 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
i
• σ |=i pi(t1, . . . , tn) iff 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
i
• σ |=i pd(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
i ∪Ri ∪Rd
• σ |=d pu(t1, . . . , tn) iff 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
d
• σ |=d pi(t1, . . . , tn) iff 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
d
• σ |=d pd(t1, . . . , tn) iff 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
d
Definition 2.1 extends in a natural way to negated
and compound formulas. Having a satisfaction defi-
nition associated with each level of strength provides
a high degree of flexibility. The same theory can
be interpreted from a perspective that allows more
freedom (u-satisfaction), or from a perspective that
is tighter and that signals when some defeasible in-
formation has been cancelled (i- and d-satisfaction).
Possible interpretations of a given set of utter-
ances with respect to a knowledge base are com-
puted using an extension of the semantic tableau
method. This extension has been proved to be both
sound and complete (Marcu, 1994). A partial or-
dering, ≤, determines the set of optimistic interpre-
tations for a theory. An interpretation m0 is pre-
ferred to, or is more optimistic than, an interpreta-
tion m1 (m0 ≤ m1) if it contains more information
and that information can be more easily updated in
the future. That means that if an interpretation m0
makes an utterance true by assigning to a relation
R a defeasible status, while another interpretation
m1 makes the same utterance true by assigning the
same relation R a stronger status, m0 will be the
preferred or optimistic one, because it is as informa-
tive as m1 and it allows more options in the future
(R can be defeated).
Pragmatic inferences are triggered by utterances.
To differentiate between them and semantic infer-
ences, we introduce a new quantifier, ∀Ut, whose se-
mantics is defined such that a pragmatic inference
of the form (∀Ut~v)(α1(~v) → α2(~v)) is instantiated
only for those objects ~t from the universe of dis-
course that pertain to an utterance having the form
α1(~t). Hence, only if the antecedent of a pragmatic
rule has been uttered can that rule be applied. A
meta-logical construct uttered applies to the logi-
cal translation of utterances. This theory yields the
following definition:
Definition 2.2 Let Φ be a theory described in terms
of stratified first-order logic that appropriately for-
malizes the semantics of lexical items and the nec-
essary conditions that trigger pragmatic inferences.
The semantics of lexical terms is formalized using
the quantifier ∀, while the necessary conditions that
pertain to pragmatic inferences are captured using
∀Ut. Let uttered(u) be the logical translation of a
given utterance or set of utterances. We say that ut-
terance u pragmatically implicates p if and only if pd
or pi is derived using pragmatic inferences in at least
one optimistic model of the theory Φ ∪ uttered(u),
and if p is not cancelled by any stronger informa-
tion (¬pu,¬pi,¬pd) in any optimistic model schema
of the theory. Symmetrically, one can define what
a negative pragmatic inference is. In both cases,
Φ ∪ uttered(u) is u-consistent.
2.2 The algorithm
Our algorithm, described in detail by Marcu (1994),
takes as input a set of first-order stratified formu-
las Φ that represents an adequate knowledge base
that expresses semantic knowledge and the necessary
conditions for triggering pragmatic inferences, and
the translation of an utterance or set of utterances
uttered(u). The algorithm builds the set of all possi-
ble interpretations for a given utterance, using a gen-
eralization of the semantic tableau technique. The
model-ordering relation filters the optimistic inter-
pretations. Among them, the defeasible inferences
that have been triggered on pragmatic grounds are
checked to see whether or not they are cancelled in
any optimistic interpretation. Those that are not
cancelled are labelled as pragmatic inferences for the
given utterance or set of utterances.
3 A set of examples
We present a set of examples that covers a repre-
sentative group of pragmatic inferences. In contrast
with most other approaches, we provide a consistent
methodology for computing these inferences and for
determining whether they are cancelled or not for
all possible configurations: simple and complex ut-
terances and sequences of utterances.
3.1 Simple pragmatic inferences
3.1.1 Lexical pragmatic inferences
A factive such as the verb regret presupposes its
complement, but as we have seen, in positive envi-
ronments, the presupposition is stronger: it is ac-
ceptable to defeat a presupposition triggered in a
negative environment (2), but is infelicitous to de-
feat one that belongs to a positive environment (1).
Therefore, an appropriate formalization of utter-
ance (3) and the requisite pragmatic knowledge will
be as shown in (4).
(3) John does not regret that Mary came to the
party.
(4) 

uttered(¬regretsu(john,
come(mary, party)))
(∀Utx, y, z)(regretsu(x, come(y, z))→
comei(y, z))
(∀Utx, y, z)(¬regretsu(x, come(y, z))→
comed(y, z))
The stratified semantic tableau that corresponds to
theory (4) is given in figure 2. The tableau yields
two model schemata (see figure 3); in both of them,
it is defeasibly inferred that Mary came to the party.
The model-ordering relation ≤ establishes m0 as the
optimistic model for the theory because it contains
as much information as m1 and is easier to defeat.
Model m0 explains why Mary came to the party is a
presupposition for utterance (3).
3.1.2 Scalar implicatures
Consider utterance (5), and its implicatures (6).
(5) John says that some of the boys went to the
theatre.
(6) Not {many/most/all} of the boys went to the
theatre.
An appropriate formalization is given in (7), where
the second formula captures the defeasible scalar im-
plicatures and the third formula reflects the relevant
semantic information for all.
(7) 

uttered(went(some(boys), theatre))
wentu(some(boys), theatre)→
(¬wentd(many(boys), theatre)∧
¬wentd(most(boys), theatre)∧
¬wentd(all(boys), theatre))
wentu(all(boys), theatre)→
(wentu(most(boys), theatre)∧
wentu(many(boys), theatre)∧
wentu(some(boys), theatre))
The theory provides one optimistic model schema
(figure 4) that reflects the expected pragmatic infer-
ences, i.e., (Not most/Not many/Not all) of the boys
went to the theatre.
3.1.3 Simple cancellation
Assume now, that after a moment of thought, the
same person utters:
(8) John says that some of the boys went to the
theatre. In fact all of them went to the the-
atre.
By adding the extra utterance to the initial
theory (7), uttered(went(all(boys), theatre)), one
would obtain one optimistic model schema in which
the conventional implicatures have been cancelled
(see figure 5).
3.2 Complex utterances
The Achilles heel for most theories of presupposition
has been their vulnerability to the projection prob-
lem. Our solution for the projection problem does
not differ from a solution for individual utterances.
Consider the following utterances and some of their
associated presuppositions (11) (the symbol ✄ pre-
cedes an inference drawn on pragmatic grounds):
(9) Either Chris is not a bachelor or he regrets
that Mary came to the party.
(10) Chris is a bachelor or a spinster.
(11) ✄ Chris is a (male) adult.
Chris is not a bachelor presupposes that Chris is a
male adult; Chris regrets that Mary came to the party
presupposes that Mary came to the party. There
is no contradiction between these two presupposi-
tions, so one would expect a conversant to infer
both of them if she hears an utterance such as (9).
However, when one examines utterance (10), one
observes immediately that there is a contradiction
between the presuppositions carried by the individ-
ual components. Being a bachelor presupposes that
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
✘✘✘✘✘✘✘
.
.
.
✏✏✏✏✏✏✏✏✏✏✏
❛❛❛❛❛❛❛
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
¬regrets(john, come(mary, party))
(∀x, y, z)(¬regrets(x, come(y, z)) → comed(y, z))
(∀x, y, z)(regrets(x,come(y, z)) → comei(y, z))
¬regrets(john, come(mary, party)) → comed(mary, party)
regrets(john, come(mary, party)) → comei(mary, party)
regrets(john, come(mary, party))
u-closed
comed(mary, party)
¬regrets(john, come(mary, party))
m 0
comei(mary, party)
m 1
Figure 2: Stratified tableau for John does not regret that Mary came to the party.
Schema # Indefeasible Infelicitously Felicitously
defeasible defeasible
m0 ¬regrets
u(john, come(mary, party)
comed(mary, party)
m1 ¬regrets
u(john, come(mary, party)
comei(mary, party) comed(mary, party)
Figure 3: Model schemata for John does not regret that Mary came to the party.
Schema # Indefeasible Infelicitously Felicitously
defeasible defeasible
m0 went
u(some(boys), theatre)
¬wentd(most(boys), theatre)
¬wentd(many(boys), theatre)
¬wentu(all(boys), theatre) ¬wentd(all(boys), theatre)
Figure 4: Model schema for John says that some of the boys went to the theatre.
Schema # Indefeasible Infelicitously Felicitously
defeasible defeasible
m0 went
u(some(boys), theatre)
wentu(most(boys), theatre) ¬wentd(most(boys), theatre)
wentu(many(boys), theatre) ¬wentd(many(boys), theatre)
wentu(all(boys), theatre) ¬wentd(all(boys), theatre)
Figure 5: Model schema for John says that some of the boys went to the theatre. In fact all of them went to
the theatre.
Chris is a male, while being a spinster presupposes
that Chris is a female. Normally, we would expect a
conversant to notice this contradiction and to drop
each of these elementary presuppositions when she
interprets (10).
We now study how stratified logic and the model-
ordering relation capture one’s intuitions.
3.2.1 Or — non-cancellation
An appropriate formalization for utterance (9)
and the necessary semantic and pragmatic knowl-
edge is given in (12).
(12) 

uttered(¬bachelor(Chris)∨
regret(Chris, come(Mary, party)))
(¬bacheloru(Chris)∨
regretu(Chris, come(Mary, party))) →
¬(¬bachelord(Chris)∧
regretd(Chris, come(Mary, party)))
¬male(Mary)
(∀x)(bacheloru(x)→
maleu(x) ∧ adultu(x) ∧ ¬marriedu(x))
(∀Utx)(¬bacheloru(x)→ marriedi(x))
(∀Utx)(¬bacheloru(x)→ adultd(x))
(∀Utx)(¬bacheloru(x)→ maled(x))
(∀Utx, y, z)(¬regretu(x, come(y, z))→
comed(y, z))
(∀Utx, y, z)(regretu(x, come(y, z))→
comei(y, z))
Besides the translation of the utterance, the initial
theory contains a formalization of the defeasible im-
plicature that natural disjunction is used as an exclu-
sive or, the knowledge that Mary is not a name for
males, the lexical semantics for the word bachelor,
and the lexical pragmatics for bachelor and regret.
The stratified semantic tableau generates 12 model
schemata. Only four of them are kept as optimistic
models for the utterance. The models yield Mary
came to the party; Chris is a male; and Chris is an
adult as pragmatic inferences of utterance (9).
3.2.2 Or — cancellation
Consider now utterance (10). The stratified se-
mantic tableau that corresponds to its logical theory
yields 16 models, but only Chris is an adult satisfies
definition 2.2 and is projected as presupposition for
the utterance.
3.3 Pragmatic inferences in sequences of
utterances
We have already mentioned that speech repairs con-
stitute a good benchmark for studying the genera-
tion and cancellation of pragmatic inferences along
sequences of utterances (McRoy and Hirst, 1993).
Suppose, for example, that Jane has two friends —
John Smith and John Pevler — and that her room-
mate Mary has met only John Smith, a married
fellow. Assume now that Jane has a conversation
with Mary in which Jane mentions only the name
John because she is not aware that Mary does not
know about the other John, who is a five-year-old
boy. In this context, it is natural for Mary to be-
come confused and to come to wrong conclusions.
For example, Mary may reply that John is not a
bachelor. Although this is true for both Johns, it
is more appropriate for the married fellow than for
the five-year-old boy. Mary knows that John Smith
is a married male, so the utterance makes sense for
her. At this point Jane realizes that Mary misun-
derstands her: all the time Jane was talking about
John Pevler, the five-year-old boy. The utterances
in (13) constitute a possible answer that Jane may
give to Mary in order to clarify the problem.
(13) a. No, John is not a bachelor.
b. I regret that you have misunderstood me.
c. He is only five years old.
The first utterance in the sequence presupposes (14).
(14) ✄ John is a male adult.
Utterance (13)b warns Mary that is very likely she
misunderstood a previous utterance (15). The warn-
ing is conveyed by implicature.
(15) ✄ The hearer misunderstood the speaker.
At this point, the hearer, Mary, starts to believe
that one of her previous utterances has been elabo-
rated on a false assumption, but she does not know
which one. The third utterance (13)c comes to clar-
ify the issue. It explicitly expresses that John is not
an adult. Therefore, it cancels the early presupposi-
tion (14):
(16) ✄/ John is an adult.
Note that there is a gap of one statement between
the generation and the cancellation of this presup-
position. The behavior described is mirrored both
by our theory and our program.
3.4 Conversational implicatures in indirect
replies
The same methodology can be applied to model-
ing conversational implicatures in indirect replies
(Green, 1992). Green’s algorithm makes use of dis-
course expectations, discourse plans, and discourse
relations. The following dialog is considered (Green,
1992, p. 68):
(17) Q: Did you go shopping?
A: a. My car’s not running.
b. The timing belt broke.
c. (So) I had to take the bus.
Answer (17) conveys a “yes”, but a reply consist-
ing only of (17)a would implicate a “no”. As Green
notices, in previous models of implicatures (Gazdar,
1979; Hirschberg, 1985), processing (17)a will block
the implicature generated by (17)c. Green solves the
problem by extending the boundaries of the analysis
to discourse units. Our approach does not exhibit
these constraints. As in the previous example, the
one dealing with a sequence of utterances, we ob-
tain a different interpretation after each step. When
the question is asked, there is no conversational im-
plicature. Answer (17)a makes the necessary con-
ditions for implicating “no” true, and the implica-
tion is computed. Answer (17)b reinforces a previous
condition. Answer (17)c makes the preconditions for
implicating a “no” false, and the preconditions for
implicating a “yes” true. Therefore, the implicature
at the end of the dialogue is that the conversant who
answered went shopping.
4 Conclusions
Unlike most research in pragmatics that focuses on
certain types of presuppositions or implicatures, we
provide a global framework in which one can ex-
press all these types of pragmatic inferences. Each
pragmatic inference is associated with a set of nec-
essary conditions that may trigger that inference.
When such a set of conditions is met, that infer-
ence is drawn, but it is assigned a defeasible status.
An extended definition of satisfaction and a notion
of “optimism” with respect to different interpreta-
tions yield the preferred interpretations for an utter-
ance or sequences of utterances. These interpreta-
tions contain the pragmatic inferences that have not
been cancelled by context or conversant’s knowledge,
plans, or intentions. The formalism yields an algo-
rithm that has been implemented in Common Lisp
with Screamer. This algorithm computes uniformly
pragmatic inferences that are associated with simple
and complex utterances and sequences of utterances,
and allows cancellations of pragmatic inferences to
occur at any time in the discourse.
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